Abstract: This paper studies stylized empirical facts regarding the e¤ects of unexpected changes in aggregate macroeconomic policies on consumers that are allowed to di¤er depending on their individual characteristics. In particular, we focus on …scal shocks due to their important e¤ects on consumers'welfare. We use data from the Consumption Expenditure Survey (CEX) to estimate impulse responses as well as multipliers for government spending and tax policy shocks. The main empirical …nding of this paper is that unexpected …scal shocks have substantially di¤erent e¤ects on consumers depending on their age, income levels, and education. In particular, the wealthiest individuals tend to behave according to the predictions of standard RBC models, whereas the poorest individuals tend to behave according to standard IS-LM (non-Ricardian) models, due to credit constraints. Furthermore, government spending policy shocks tend to decrease consumption inequality, whereas tax policy shocks most negatively a¤ect the lives of the poor, more so than the rich, thus increasing consumption inequality.
Introduction
Most of the macroeconomic literature relies on the representative agent paradigm. The assumption of a representative agent is generally made for technical simplicity, since the solution of dynamic models with heterogeneous agents is computationally challenging. However, the study of aggregate data might provide the incorrect evaluation of economic theories.
For example, Attanasio and Weber (1993) demonstrate that the use of microeconomic data can overturn rejections of consumer intertemporal optimization models based on aggregate data. In addition, the assumption comes at the cost of preventing the analysis of important questions such as whether economic policies equally a¤ect individuals with di¤erent characteristics, whether they in ‡uence inequality, or what are the macroeconomic consequences of aggregate ‡uctuations on the welfare of individuals that di¤er in their consumption patterns.
In other words, while the representative agent assumption allows macroeconomists to study how average values of macroeconomic variables are a¤ected by economic policies, it does not allow them to study how these policies a¤ect the distribution of such variables across households.
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This paper focuses on studying the e¤ects of unexpected changes in aggregate macroeconomic policies on consumers that are allowed to di¤er depending on their individual characteristics. Fiscal policy analysis is an especially important area of macroeconomics since it has direct implications for consumers'welfare. The literature has extensively studied the e¤ects of government spending and tax policy shocks on aggregate macroeconomic variables; one of the approaches, which we focus on, has been narrative -see Ramey and Shapiro (1998) , Ramey (2009 Ramey ( , 2011a , and Romer and Romer (2010) . 2 The narrative approach uses narrative records (such as presidential speeches and newspapers) to identify the size, timing and magnitude of major …scal changes, and identi…es …scal shocks as those changes that 1 Theoretical papers on heterogeneous agents models include Rios-Rull (1995) , Krusell and Smith (1998) , Heathcote (2005) , among others. The latter papers have theoretically developed and calibrated heterogeneous agents models, whereas our focus is on the empirical estimation of the e¤ects of …scal policy shocks. 2 See also Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) , Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004), Cavallo (2005) , Perotti (2005 Perotti ( , 2007 and Rossi and Zubairy (2011) for related papers. Ramey (2011b) provides an extensive review of the literature.
were taken for reasons exogenous to the business cycle. A maintained assumption in these papers is that shocks a¤ect all consumers in exactly the same way. However, realistically, such shocks may a¤ect individuals di¤erently depending on their individual-speci…c characteristics, such as income, education, or age. Studying whether this is the case, and who gains and who loses from unexpected changes in government spending and tax policy is the main focus of this paper. An additional bene…t of using household level data besides analyzing heterogeneity is that we can avoid the so-called "aggregation bias", unavoidable in aggregate data where researchers have no control over the aggregation process. We evaluate the empirical importance of the aggregation bias and analyze its implications for the analysis of …scal policy shocks on aggregate behavior.
The main empirical …nding of this paper is that unexpected government spending and tax policy shocks have substantially di¤erent e¤ects on consumers depending on their age, income and education levels. Our empirical evidence is based on a narrative approach, and in particular a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model, as in Ramey (2011a) and Romer and Romer (2010) . 3 By using a Structural VAR model where the shock is ordered …rst, we ensure that the shock series is orthogonal to past information contained in the other variables included in the VAR; at the same time, we allow variables other than the shock to contemporaneously react to the shock itself. Our main …nding is that individuals whose consumption levels are most negatively a¤ected by a government spending policy shock (i.e.
an unexpected increase in government spending) are the wealthiest and younger individuals (the working and the young age groups), whereas consumption of the poorest increases the most. Thus, government spending policy shocks tend to decrease consumption inequality.
Regarding tax policy shocks, an unexpected increase in taxes mainly decreases consumption of the poorest, and it is mostly borne by the youngest category, whereas consumption of the wealthiest individuals increases the most. 4 The di¤erences among groups are strongly statistically signi…cant. This implies that tax policy shocks most negatively a¤ect consump-3 See Perotti (2005 Perotti ( , 2007 for a VAR analysis of …scal policy shocks without a narrative approach. 4 The fact that an increase in government spending has a large positive e¤ect on the oldest individuals and negative e¤ects on the youngest individuals may signal that the government spending crowds out the younger groups consumption since the latter know they will have to pay back later.
tion of the poor, more so than the rich, thus increasing consumption inequality. At the same time, the government spending results suggest an increase in consumption levels for individuals belonging to the poorest income quantiles. Thus, it does matter which type of unexpected …scal changes take place. We also show that our main results are robust to considering di¤erent types of tax policy shocks as well as considering only unexpected tax policy shocks or the political party that implemented the tax changes.
This paper's analysis is very related to the large literature on the e¤ects of government spending and tax shocks on macroeconomic aggregates, such as Ramey (2009 Ramey ( , 2011a and Romer and Romer (2010) . While the previous literature focuses on the e¤ects of shocks on aggregate data, we focus instead on e¤ects on individual consumption by allowing individuals to be heterogeneous. Our research is also very related to Owyang and Zubairy (2009) and Nekarda and Ramey (2011) ; the former analyze the e¤ects of government spending shocks on state-level personal income and employment, and …nd regional patterns in the way government spending policy shocks a¤ect state-level variables. The latter study the e¤ects of government purchases at the industry level. The di¤erence between our paper and theirs is that we focus on heterogeneity across individual consumers, whereas Owyang and Regarding the economic interpretation of our results, our paper is very related to Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2006) . Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2006) show that a calibrated Keynesian model with sticky prices and rule-of-thumb consumers can generate an increase in consumption when government spending increases. Schmitt-Grohe'and Uribe (2010) note that the government spending shocks identi…ed in Ramey and Shapiro (1998) consumption to a positive government spending shock. 6 Our results provide further empirical support to the analysis in Gali et al. (2006) by showing that the poorest individuals, the ones that are more likely to be credit constrained, have a positive consumption response to …scal policy shocks; on the other hand, the richest individuals'consumption responds negatively.
Overall, the response of the whole population will depend on which of the two prevails.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data while Section 3 describes the VAR we estimate. Section 4 and 5 discuss results for government spending and tax policy shocks, respectively. Section 6 reports more results based on aggregate data, and Section 7 discusses robustness to the source of the tax shock, expectations as well as the political party in power. Section 8 concludes.
Data Description
We collect information on consumption and income heterogeneity across individuals by using household consumption expenditure data from the interview portion of the Consumer and Expenditure Survey (CEX), conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The measure of government spending and tax policy shocks we use are the time series developed by Ramey (2011a) and Romer and Romer (2010) . We use quarterly data that span 1983:Q4-2008:Q4 for our government spending shock analysis, and 1983:Q4-2007:Q4 in our tax policy shock analysis. The starting date of the sample is determined by the availability of CEX data, whereas the end date is determined by the availability of data on the government spending and tax policy shocks. Here we provide a detailed description of the data as well as preliminary data analyses that establish the usefulness of the CEX database for our purposes.
In particular, we demonstrate that existing empirical results in the literature are consistent 6 Note that our approach is very di¤erent from Johnson, Parker and Souleles (2006) , who exploit the 2001 U.S. tax rebate to measure the change in consumption expenditures caused by receipt of the rebate; their paper focuses on the e¤ects of …scal policy shocks originated by transfers, whereas we focus on the e¤ects of …scal policy shocks originated by defense spending. The latter, which we consider, is appropriate for testing the di¤erent behavior of Ricardian versus non-Ricardian theories of the e¤ects of government spending, which is one of our goals.
with those based on aggregate CEX data. However, CEX data have the important advantage of being suitable for more disaggregate analyses, which we undertake in the following sections.
Regarding CEX data, the interview survey follows a given household for …ve quarters, but gathers data on consumption for the last four interviews. Following Lusardi (1996), we focus on nondurable consumption de…ned as expenditures on food, alcoholic beverages, tobacco, utilities, personal care, household operations, public transportation, gas and motor oil, and miscellaneous expenses. For our measure of income, we use the household's income after taxes for the 12 months before the survey is taken. We drop households with missing data or non-positive consumption or income data. Also, we drop the 1986:Q1 observation due to missing data. An additional concern is the presence of measurement error in the data, in particular for income data reported in the CEX (Lusardi, 1996) . Our procedure involves constructing pseudo-panels by averaging individuals belonging to groups identi…ed by individual-speci…c characteristics; thus, our procedure attenuates idiosyncratic measurement error by averaging individual-level consumption data. Individual-level income data, which are subject to stronger measurement error, are used only to construct income quintiles in our main paper, thus not raising strong concerns about the e¤ects of measurement error in income in our main results.
Our measure of consumption is the log of real per capita consumption expenditures.
To construct this measure, we …rst transform CEX consumption in real terms using nonseasonally adjusted CPI data (since the CEX data are initially non-seasonally adjusted) from the St. Louis Federal Reserve's FRED database. Then, we seasonally adjust the data by taking a centered moving average of 5 quarters. Finally, we divide CEX household data by the number of family members for each household to get a measure of per capita consumption.
We study the e¤ects of government spending and tax policy shocks identi…ed via a narrative approach. The main advantage of using the narrative approach relative to identifying shocks via a Structural VAR is that the shock is directly identi…ed by using information outside the VAR estimation, and hence does not depend on which variables are included in the VAR or which identifying assumptions are made. Ramey (2011a) shows that the defense news shock does not have good explanatory power for real government spending in the sample period we are working with, which is constrained by the availability of data in the CEX.
Ramey (2011a) develops an alternative narrative measure of government defense spending shocks based on the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The SPF shock is the di¤er-ence between actual real government spending growth (measured as defense spending) and the SPF's forecasted growth using an information set lagged one period. She shows that this measure does have good explanatory power for government spending in the time period that we consider, so we focus on this measure in our paper.
We also use the tax policy shock measure developed by Romer and Romer (2010) . The measure is constructed by using records of presidential speeches and Congressional reports.
Using the latter sources, Romer and Romer (2010) identi…ed the size, timing and principal motivations behind all major post-war tax policy innovations. By identifying the motivations for the tax change based on the legislation, they derive an exogenous tax shock that only contains tax changes a¤ecting the long run state of the economy, instead of short term ‡uctuations. An example of an exogenous tax change is one that is motivated by the need to improve output growth in the long run, rather than to return output to its trend level when …ghting a recession. The tax shock we focus on is the exogenous tax series measured as the change in tax liabilities as a percentage of GDP, labeled "EXOGENRRATIO" in Romer and Romer (2010) , which is the same measure that they use in their empirical analysis. If the shocks were truly exogenous to short term ‡uctuations of output, one could proceed with a simple univariate regression. However, Romer and Romer (2010) recognize that identifying the motivation behind the legislated tax changes can be di¢ cult, so they estimate a Structural VAR (SVAR) model, and we follow the same approach.
It is important to verify that CEX data are appropriate for our analysis, and that using aggregate CEX data does not invalidate fundamental empirical …ndings in the existing literature. It is also important to verify that our VAR speci…cation is suitable for the analysis even though it includes fewer variables than in Ramey (2011a) and Romer and Romer (2010) , due to concerns about parameter proliferation and its negative e¤ects in small samples on VAR estimation with a large number of endogenous variables. We demonstrate that this is the case by comparing aggregate CEX data results with those in Ramey (2011a) and Romer and Romer (2010) , which are based on the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) data.
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Although Slesnick (1992 Slesnick ( , 1998 o¤ers some empirical evidence that the CEX data and the personal consumption expenditure data from the NIPA do not necessarily measure the same quantities, their correlation is substantial (Attanasio, 1998) . Furthermore, we are concerned mainly about responses to policy shocks, which might be less a¤ected by di¤erences in the levels of the variables.
We start by replicating Ramey's (2011a) and Romer and Romer's (2010) per capita terms, we use population data from the United States Census.
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In a …rst exercise, we consider a basic Structural VAR (SVAR) speci…cation inspired by Ramey (2011a) :
where Z t is a vector containing the SPF shock, the log of real per capita total government spending and the log of real per capita aggregate consumption,
L is the lag operator, and U t is a vector of shocks identi…ed via the recursive ordering procedure, where the SPF shock is ordered …rst, and consumption last. This VAR is similar to Ramey (2011a) except that she also includes an average tax rate variable and an interest rate variable (we do not include the latter in order to keep our VAR parsimonious, due to small sample concerns). By using a Structural VAR model where the shock is ordered …rst, we ensure that the shock series is orthogonal to past information contained in the other variables included in the VAR; at the same time, we allow variables other than the shock to contemporaneously react to the shock itself. We replicate the analysis in Ramey (2011a) by using exactly her aggregate variables, time periods and number of lags (four). The main di¤erence is that we replace her measures of aggregate nondurable consumption from NIPA with our measure of CEX aggregate nondurable consumption. who …nds an (insigni…cant) negative impact response while we have a positive impact response. We also …nd a signi…cant positive response one quarter after the shock whereas Ramey (2011a) instead …nds a negative signi…cant response in quarters 2-8. For nondurables and services, our response has a shape similar to Ramey (2011a, Fig. XII) , except for the fact that we …nd a short positive response on impact. Services consumption shows a negative (although insigni…cant) impact response similar to Ramey's (2011a) , except that ours is using aggregate CEX consumption data in place of consumption from NIPA. CEX aggregate consumption is constructed the same way as the NIPA consumption aggregate, that is:
where c i;t is consumption attributed to individual i at time t in the CEX survey, and n t is the number of individuals in the survey at time t. It is clear that the responses are both negative and signi…cant, and very similar in magnitude.
Furthermore, we report multipliers. The multipliers are calculated as follows. The peak
, where C t is aggregate consumption at time t, G t is government spending and G and C are the average government spending and consumption values over the entire time series. The cumulative multiplier is instead calculated
. The multiplier de…nition is similar to that commonly used in the literature. Furthermore, we normalize the impact response of G t to the …scal policy shock to be unity, so we can interpret the impulse-responses of consumption at horizon h (reported in the …gures) to be h-period multiplier (although not rescaled by the long-run values of G t and C t ). Panel A in Table 1 reports both peak and cumulative impulse responses (multipliers) for the various measures of consumption, including the CEX (…rst column) as well as Nondurables and Services (column labeled "ND and Services"), Nondurables (labeled "ND"), Services (labeled "Services"), and Durables (labeled "Durables"). In all cases, the cumulative responses are negative. Panel B reports statistical tests on the pairwise di¤er-ences between the groups; asterisks denote signi…cantly di¤erent cumulative responses: one asterisk denotes signi…cance at the 68% level, two asterisks denote signi…cance at the 90% level, and three asterisks denote signi…cance at the 95% level. Although the tests do …nd quantitatively di¤erent cumulative and peak responses for the various measures, most likely due to the di¤erent quantitative impact e¤ect, the responses are qualitatively very similar and, overall, their shapes are also very similar, which increases our con…dence in using CEX consumption data in our analysis.
In a second exercise, we consider the SVAR in Romer and Romer (2010) :
smaller in magnitude.
where Z t is a vector containing the Romer and Romer's (2010) tax policy shock and the log of real per capita consumption. The VAR is identi…ed with a recursive ordering procedure, where the shock is ordered …rst and consumption last. The number of lags is 4. Figure 2 reports impulse responses of nondurables consumption to a tax policy shock using aggregate NIPA data (Panel A); Panel B in Figure 2 reports instead the response to a tax policy shock using CEX aggregate consumption data in place of NIPA consumption data. The mediumto long-run responses are negative and similar in magnitude, although the CEX response is positive on impact and the NIPA response is larger in magnitude, and more signi…cant.
Panel A in Table 2 reports both peak and cumulative impulse responses for the various measures of consumption that we consider. All are negative and very similar in magnitude.
Panel B shows that they are also not statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from each other.
To summarize our results, we conclude that empirical results based on aggregate CEX data are very similar to those currently reported in the literature, even in our simple VARs with fewer variables than in the literature (driven by the small sample constraints in CEX data (1993) . We do not follow this convention since our goal is to study di¤erences in consumption responses across groups, where students and retirees could be potentially interesting groups.
Income groups are based on income quintiles. Finally, education groups are broken into four categories: "no high school degree", "high school degree", "some college", and "college degree or more". Table 3 contains the average cell size for each group category. In general,
we have cell sizes similar to Attanasio and Weber (1993, 1995) .
In order to examine the consequences of a government spending policy shock, we consider a three variable VAR inspired by Ramey (2011a) and eq. (1), with SPF …scal shock, government spending, and consumption. As previously discussed, the VAR is identi…ed with a recursive ordering procedure where the shock is ordered …rst and consumption last. We estimate the VAR separately for individuals belonging to each group j; j = 1; :::; J, where J is the total number of groups. The household groups are identi…ed based on the individual characteristics previously discussed (income, age and education). We also include a constant and a quadratic time trend. Speci…cally, our VAR is:
where Z j t is a vector containing the SPF shock, the log of real per capita government spending and the log of real per capita consumption for individuals belonging to group j, A j (L) = 11 In unreported results, we also consider groups based on age cohorts. In particular, we construct …ve cohorts with twenty years of data (e.g. the …rst cohort contains individuals born between 1895 and 1914, the second contains individuals born between 1915 and 1934, and so forth). We again …nd signi…cant di¤erences in the e¤ects of …scal shocks on individuals depending on their age cohort.
2 are vectors of parameters, and U j t is a vector of residuals. Our choice of lag length, time trend, and per capita consumption is based on Ramey (2011a).
We estimate eq. (4) separately for each of the J groups of households.
In order to examine the consequences of a tax policy shock, we consider a bivariate SVAR similar to Romer and Romer (2010) , with the tax policy shock and consumption.
Our measure of tax policy shock is Romer and Romer's (2010) exogenous tax shock, EXO-GENRRATIO. 12 We estimate the VAR separately for individuals belonging to each group j; j = 1; :::; J. Speci…cally, our equation is:
where Z j t is a vector containing the Romer and Romer's (2010) shock, the log of real per capita consumption and the log of real per income consumption for individuals belonging to
K j is a vector of constants, and j t is a vector of residuals. 13 The SVAR is identi…ed with a recursive ordering procedure, with the shock ordered …rst and consumption ordered last.
14 The next two sections report estimated impulse responses (IRFs) to either a positive government spending policy shock or a positive tax policy shock, as well as standard error bands calculated using a parametric bootstrap (Berkowitz and Kilian, 2000) . The standard error bands have 68% coverage rate, as is common practice in the …scal policy literature (see Ramey, 2011a, and Romer and Romer, 2010) . We also calculate peak and cumulative responses that measure the cumulative e¤ect of the policy shock and can be interpreted as a multiplier measure -see Spilimbergo et al. (2009) . We report statistical tests on the pairwise di¤erences between peak responses among the various groups; asterisks denote statistical signi…cance: one asterisk denotes signi…cance at the 68% level, two asterisks denote signi…cance at the 90% level, and three asterisks denote signi…cance at the 95% level. We also consider signi…cance for cumulative responses, denoted by daggers: one dagger denotes 12 The empirical results reported in the paper are robust to using EXOGENR instead of EXOGENRRATIO. 13 Romer and Romer (2010) use 3 years of lags in their model, but our more limited sample period prevents using that many lags. 14 Note that we do not include government spending shocks in eq. (5) and we do not include tax shocks in eq. (4) due to the fact that our sample is too short to include many variables in the VAR.
signi…cance at the 68% level, two daggers denote signi…cance at the 90% level, and three daggers denote signi…cance at the 95% level.
Heterogeneity in Individuals'Responses to Government Spending Policy Shocks
This section presents the main empirical results for the responses to a government spending shock. We discuss results for groups of individuals sorted by either income levels or age.
Additional results for individuals sorted by education level are reported in Appendix A.
To preview our results, in general we …nd substantial empirical evidence in favor of heterogeneity across consumers'responses to an aggregate positive government spending policy shock. In particular, we …nd that the poorest and the oldest individuals'consumption levels are the most positively a¤ected by the shock. Consumption of the middle-age, the youngest and the wealthiest groups is the most negatively a¤ected by the government spending policy shock.
IRFs and Multipliers by Income Groups
Impulse responses for consumption of individuals grouped by income quintiles are displayed in Figure 3 . The …gure also reports the aggregate response calculated as the response of the average individual's log consumption. That is, the aggregate consumption response is de…ned to be the response of In our analysis, we are able to disentangle the consequences of government spending shocks on consumers with di¤erent levels of income, and therefore, facing di¤erent levels of credit constraints. Consumers in the poorest income quantiles, which are more likely to be credit constrained, end up increasing consumption. On the other hand, consumers in the richest income quantiles, which are less likely to be credit constrained, end up decreasing consump-15 Gali et al. (2007) show that another necessary condition for consumption to rise in response to a …scal expansion is price stickiness in goods markets as well as, in one version of their model, imperfectly competitive labor markets.
tion, as the theory predicts.
The reason why we can claim that poorest individuals are more likely to be credit constrained is the empirical evidence discussed in Attanasio et al. (2008) , according to which low income consumers are substantially more credit constrained than high income consumers.
Interestingly, we …nd that approximately 20% of consumers (the wealthiest) increase their consumption after a government spending shock, and hence are estimated not to be credit constrained. This estimate is very similar to that reported in Attanasio et al. (2008) for CEX data, according to which approximately 15% of the population with the highest income is not liquidity constrained.
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We also verify in Appendix B that income of the poorer individuals does increase, following an unexpected increase in government spending. We do so by including income as an additional variable in the SVAR. This is important to verify because the mechanism that leads to the increase in consumption for rule-of-thumb consumers is exactly an increase in income. Indeed, income of all groups increases following a positive government spending shock, including that of the poorer individuals, as the theory would predict.
Finally, note that, typically, richest individuals would have higher consumption levels than poorer individuals. Fiscal shocks, by increasing consumption of the poorest and decreasing consumption of the richest, overall tend to decrease consumption heterogeneity.
IRFs and Multipliers by Age Groups
Panel A in Figure 4 shows the impulse response of consumption to a positive government spending shock for individuals grouped by age. Most of the youngest groups experience a negative and statistically signi…cant response at some point over the three years following the shock. The oldest category, instead, has a signi…cantly positive increase in consumption for a few quarters after the shock.
Panel A in Table 5 provides additional results by reporting the peak and cumulative 16 In their paper, Attanasio et al. (2008) Overall, these results provide empirical evidence that age also matters in the response to a government spending shock, and that age groups have substantially heterogeneous multipliers.
Heterogeneity in Individuals'Responses to Tax Policy Shocks
This section presents the main empirical results for the tax policy shock. We focus on the SVAR model, eq. (5). We estimate both the impulse responses and the cumulative impulse responses of consumption to an increase in tax liabilities as a ratio of GDP. This section reports results for individuals sorted according to either income levels or age; Appendix A discusses results when the source of heterogeneity is education.
To preview our results, we …nd that, after an unexpected increase in taxes, the wealthiest groups experience a signi…cant increase in consumption, whereas the poorest quintiles have a signi…cantly negative response. When looking at individual heterogeneity by age group, the youngest group experiences the most dramatic decrease in consumption, whereas the response of consumption of all the other groups is signi…cantly positive on impact. The response of the youngest is signi…cantly di¤erent from that of the other age groups. These 17 The multipliers are in unit terms. That is, a 1 dollar increase in government spending leads to a 0.10 dollars decrease in consumption for the middle-age group. 18 Note that these results seem at odd with the …nding in Attanasio et al. (2008) that there is no evidence that the younger groups are more credit constrained that the older groups. However, note that their oldest group includes individuals that are 55 year-old or older. If we group together individuals that are 45 to 70 year-old and individuals that are 71 or older, we also do not …nd empirical evidence that consumption increases.
results again highlight the importance of allowing for heterogeneity in the individuals' responses, which aggregate data would not be able to uncover. Table 6 , Panel A, shows. In particular, the responses of the richest groups (whose consumption cumulatively increases by 0.02% in the 5 years after the shock) are statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from those of the other quintiles (whose consumption decreases by -0.07%, approximately) at the 68% signi…cance level.
IRFs and Multipliers by Income Quintiles
Overall, unexpected increases in taxes tend to hurt the poor and especially increase consumption of the wealthiest. Thus, tax shocks tend to increase consumption inequality.
It is worthwhile to stress again how using only aggregate data would miss the heterogeneous e¤ects that unexpected tax increases would have on consumption and income for the various categories.
IRFs and Multipliers by Age Groups
Panel A in Figure 6 reports impulse responses of consumption for individuals sorted according to their age. While aggregate consumption decreases, the …gure shows that the decrease is mostly born by the youngest category (15-24 years-old): the response of consumption of all the other groups is insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero, except on impact, when it is significantly positive. Looking at the comparisons across groups, reported in Panel B of Table 7 , the cumulative consumption response of the youngest category, whose consumption decreases by -0.05% over the …ve years following the shock, is statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from that of all of the other groups as well as the aggregate. The results demonstrate that the heterogeneity in individuals'responses across age groups is not only con…ned to government spending shocks, but also holds for tax policy shocks.
Aggregate Responses
An additional bene…t of using household level data besides analyzing heterogeneity is that we can control the aggregation process. This enables us to avoid the aggregation bias that might be present when working with aggregate data. Speci…cally, Attanasio andWeber (1993, 1995) point out that an aggregation bias will be introduced if researchers use aggregate data by taking the logarithm of the mean (the common procedure used when working with aggregate data) instead of the mean of the logarithm. In order to construct our aggregate pseudo panel dataset we calculate:
where c i;t represents individual i's consumption level, H t is the total number of households at time t, and t is time. When only aggregate data is available, one would instead calculate:
Note that the latter is the measure we discussed in Section 2. By comparing (6) and (7) we can compare average multipliers calculated across individual responses with the multiplier based on aggregate consumption data.
Another interesting exercise we perform is to compare our results based on the two alternative measures of CEX data, either (6) or (7), with those based on NIPA data for three di¤erent measures of Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE): nondurables, services, and durables consumption.
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Figures 7 and 8 depict impulse responses using aggregate CEX consumption data (eq.
(6), labeled "CEX"), CEX with aggregate data only (eq. (7), labeled "CEX biased"), nondurables and services consumption (labeled "ND and services"), services consumption (labeled "Services"), and durables consumption (labeled "Durables"). Figure 7 reports results for the response to a government spending shock in the SVAR model (4) and Figure 8 reports results for the tax policy shock in the SVAR model (3).
Panel A in Figure 7 shows that the responses of aggregate CEX consumption, eqs. (6) or (7), are very di¤erent from each other. The response of aggregate consumption calculated according to eq. (6) are positive on impact, reaching a peak one quarter after the shock, then slowly disappear over time. The response of aggregate consumption calculated according to eq. (7) are instead negative on impact, and they reach their peak after about a year.
The latter are much more similar to the pattern found in the data by Ramey (2011a), among others. In fact, Panel B in Figure 7 shows that for both nondurables and services consumption as well as durables, the pattern of the response in NIPA data is very similar to that of eq. (7). Note that the response of services consumption (middle …gure in panel B) is instead negative but mostly insigni…cant. The implication is that by using aggregate data that do not control for the aggregation bias, researchers might overestimate the negative e¤ects of government spending shocks.
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On the other hand, Panel A in Figure 8 shows that the responses to a tax policy shock are very similar: positive on impact, and then negative after a few quarters until they reach a peak around a year after the shock. The increase in consumption that we observe in CEX 19 Note that, in order to be consistent with the literature, the CEX aggregate measure reported in Table   2 is eq. (7). 20 Unreported results show that both the peak and the cumulative multipliers of the CEX measure in eq.
(6) are signi…cantly di¤erent from those of eq. (7) 
Robustness Analyses
While the government spending analysis relies on unanticipated shocks, the tax policy analysis relies on shocks that are a mixture of anticipated and unanticipated shocks; it is therefore be important to consider the case of unanticipated shocks only. Furthermore, it might matter which types of tax shocks are implemented (whether, for example, they concern individual income, corporate income or employment) or which political party was in power at the time of the implementation. We consider each of these concerns, and show that our main results are robust to considering unanticipated tax policy shocks, income or corporate income tax shocks. While the some of the results might be di¤erent if one considers employment tax shocks, our main results for the wealthiest and the poorest quintiles are the same, and for the rest of the quintiles there is too much uncertainty in our sample to conclude that the responses in the employment tax case are di¤erent from those we discuss in the main part of the paper. Finally, we consider whether the political party in power a¤ects the responses. Figure   14 reports results for eq. (5) where we replace the Romer and Romer's (2010) shock with the shock interacted with a dummy variable that equals one if the Republican party is in power; similarly, Figure 15 reports results for eq. (5) where we replace the Romer and Romer's (2010) shock with the shock interacted with a dummy variable that equals one if the Democratic party is in power. The …gures show that the results conditional on a Republican party regime are very similar to our main results, whereas those conditional on a Democratic party regime are not, however the latter are again very imprecisely estimated and never signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. The reason is that we have many more episodes of tax shocks under Republican regimes (both positive and negative) than under the Democratic one, which help us identify the e¤ects more precisely in the former case.
Overall, when the empirical …ndings di¤er from our main results, typically they are associated with insigni…cant di¤erences. We therefore conclude that our main …ndings are robust to the political parties in power as well as the type of tax shock being implemented, at least based on our limited sample.
Conclusion
Our empirical results uncover signi…cant di¤erences in disaggregate individuals'consumption responses to government spending and tax policy shocks, which would not be possible to uncover with traditional analyses based on aggregate data.
In particular, unexpected increases in government spending policy hurt the young and the wealthiest the most in terms of consumption. The wealthiest experience the highest cumulative drop in consumption whereas consumption of the poorest categories increases signi…cantly. On the other hand, unexpected increases in taxes hurt especially the youngest and the poorer groups in terms of consumption, whereas the wealthiest experience a signi…cant increase in consumption. Government spending policy shocks tend to decrease consumption inequality, whereas tax policy shocks tend to increase consumption inequality.
Another advantage of using disaggregate data is that it is possible to create aggregate data that are more suitable for economic analyses. We …nd that aggregation does not matter much when studying the e¤ects of tax policy shocks. However, properly aggregated CEX data behave di¤erently from traditional aggregate data in response to a government spending shock. In particular, traditionally aggregated CEX data show a delayed and signi…cant decrease in aggregate consumption after a government spending shock, which is instead signi…cantly positive for about a year after the initial shock according to our aggregate CEX measure.
These results suggest that it is important to allow for heterogeneity in individuals'behavior when studying the e¤ects of …scal policy shocks. Existing theoretical models suggest that …scal shocks may have very di¤erent e¤ects on consumption depending on whether consumers are credit constrained. Our empirical results show that indeed individuals respond to shocks di¤erently depending on their wealth, education and age, highlighting the fact that, indeed, consumers who are most likely credit constrained do increase their consumption after an unexpected increase in government spending. As we show, these interesting results are in line with theoretical macroeconomic models that allow for a fraction of consumers to be credit constrained. results. Individuals are sorted in groups with either no high school degree ("<12 years"), high school graduates ("HS Grad"), individuals exposed to some college ("13-15 years"), and those with at least a college degree (" 16 years"). however the e¤ects become negative in the medium run for low education groups, whereas they are always positive for highly educated individuals. Table A .2 shows that most of the groups experience an overall increase in consumption and that there are only few statistically signi…cant di¤erences among education groups as well as relative to the aggregate.
Appendix B
We study more in detail the transmission mechanism of government spending shocks by including income in our SVAR. In particular, the theory predicts that rule-of-thumb consumers increase their consumption after an unexpected increase in government spending because the latter increases their income. In other words, since these individuals are not forward looking and instead decide their consumption as a …xed fraction of their income, their consumption should increase whenever their income increases. We verify the theory by including income as an additional variable in the SVAR, and modifying the identi…cation accordingly, with the shock ordered …rst, then government spending, income and consumption. Although income reported in the CEX is subject to measurement error (see Lusardi, 1996) , we nevertheless use it as a …rst approximation for our analysis. data from the CBO. The advantage of using CPS data is that it is less subject to measurement error. The disadvantage is that it needs to be merged with the CEX data using the assumption that the poorest quintile in the CPS dataset is comparable to that in the CEX data. As it is not clear whether the advantages would overcome the disadvantages, we focus on CEX data. Notes: The table reports the cumulative Impulse Response (that is, the sum of the responses at horizons from 1 to 20 quarters) of consumption to a government spending policy shock for several measures of consumption: the CEX (eq. 2) and NIPA aggregates: nondurables and services (labeled "ND and Services"), Non Durables (labeled "ND"), services, and durables. It also reports the statistical signi…cance of comparing the multipliers across groups. Statistical signi…cance of the peak multiplier is indicated by asterisks: * , ** , and *** denote 68%, 90%, and 95% signi…cance, respectively. Statistical signi…cance of the cumulative multiplier is indicated by daggers: y , yy , and yyy denote 68%, 90%, and 95% signi…cance, respectively. shock for several measures of consumption: the CEX (eq. 2) and NIPA aggregates: nondurables and services (labeled "ND and Services"), Non Durables (labeled "ND"), services, and durables. It also reports the statistical signi…cance of comparing the multipliers across groups. Statistical signi…cance of the peak multiplier is indicated by asterisks: * , ** , and *** denote 68%, 90%, and 95% signi…cance, respectively. Statistical signi…cance of the cumulative multiplier is indicated by daggers: y , yy , and yyy denote 68%, 90%, and 95% signi…cance, respectively. Statistical signi…cance of the cumulative multiplier is indicated by daggers: y , yy , and yyy denote 68%, 90%, and 95% signi…cance, respectively. Statistical signi…cance of the cumulative multiplier is indicated by daggers: y , yy , and yyy denote 68%, 90%, and 95% signi…cance, respectively. either no high school degree ("<12 years"), high school graduates ("HS Grad"), individuals exposed to some college ("13-15 years"), or those with at least a college degree (" 16 years").
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